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The openings produced by the Syriza phenomenon have been closed by
Syriza itself. What, then, is the current state of the Greek political left with
yet another national vote pending? 
SYRIZA President Alexis Tsipras addresses supporters in Patras. Menelaos Mich/Demotix.
All rights reserved.
In the study of society and politics in contemporary Europe, Greece lends itself
as a case of dynamism, growth, realignment, recomposition, fissure and
fragmentation in the political arena. Over the last few years social contention
has increased, producing an overhaul of the political system. This comes in the
context of the deep economic crisis and its brutal neoliberal management
through a variety of austerity measures that have devastated the overwhelming
majority of the Greek society.
In this article we focus on the developments of parties in Greece the left of the
political spectrum and attempt an analysis of the conditions and dynamics in the
current conjuncture. The Left constitutes an important parameter not only for
the political system but also for the social movements and for the shaping of the
dominant ideological frame – perhaps more so today due to the inherently fluid
state of affairs.
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Syriza’s experiment
Syriza’s communication strategy under Tsipras’ leadership since 2008, and
especially after 2010, was one premised on the potential of left governmentality
and the shift from an oppositional imaginary into a ruling one. This was an
experiment immersed in uncertainty from the very beginning. Everything was at
stake –Syriza’s cohesion, its leadership’s popularity, the coercive capacity of the
clientelistic Greek state, and the Troika’s and the EU’s true flexibility.
The latter was a key expectation in Syriza’s strategising and one on which its
programmatic positions were crafted. The slogan ‘No sacrifice for the Euro, no
delusion for the drachma’ was quite popular back then but gradually it
disappeared from the vocabulary of both members and officials.
Challenging the dominant political paradigm, which has its origins in
Synaspismos affirming that the solution had to be sought within the confines of
the single currency, remained marginal within the party. Yet, the nucleus of the
Eurozone - Germany, France and the European Commission - stayed firmly
attached to the agenda they were warning Tsipras about months before he won
the election of January 2015.
Potential allies, namely Italy, proved unstable, unable and unwilling to push for
less strictness in dealing with Greece. The balance of power within the
Eurozone and between the EU side and the IMF side of the Troika could not be
shifted simply based on Syriza’s growing domestic and pan-European appeal.
On none of the three main axes of the negotiations - the debt, structural reforms
and budget balances – did the lenders balk. Both their ideological dogmas and
their interests remained deeply entrenched and inelastic.
Syriza had of course travelled a long distance from early 2012 to early 2015:
diluting its political positioning on a variety of issues, flattening out the edges of
its slogans, downplaying the more radical elements of its policy proposals and
shelving some of them altogether in the context of a general drift to the right,
while preparing to take over executive power.
This continued after its electoral victory in January 2015 when its inability or
reluctance to implement its programme was covered by symbolic moves and by
fully prioritising the negotiations with the international lenders. In a sense, the
seeds of the eventual capitulation in July were sown in the previous years and
watered in the previous months.
Syriza gradually shifted towards the model of a ‘normal’ party, a broker party,
which acted as a mediator between diverse interests. Within Syriza a core
nucleus of leading officials designed and implemented government strategy,
without systematic consultation with the party organs. Decision-making became
increasingly centralised.
Local self-organisation gave way to hierarchical institutions of power and the
pedagogical possibilities that characterised the party’s relations with the
movements since the late 1990s were subsumed into careful balancing acts
between the radical segments of the party, public opinion and the exigencies of
power. Thereby, the drift of Syriza to the right between 2012 and 2015 was also
escorted by demobilisation and the shift of contentious politics from the social to
the political field – from the streets to the ballot box.
Various commentators and activists had warned about this since approximately
2012, but attention remained focused not on the problem of Syriza but on that
of Syriza taking power and exercising it in a radical way. Yet, the latter concern
is largely dependent on the former’s appropriate resolution. For all its
momentum Syriza was in 2015 still a new party, within which neither significant
cohesion that could run the test of incumbency nor programmatic clarity that
would suffice for full confrontation existed.
Stathis Gourgouris described Syriza as ‘a loose, self-contradictory, and
internally antagonistic coalition of leftist thought and practice, very much
dependent on the capacity of social movements of all kinds, thoroughly
decentralized and driven by the activism of solidarity networks ...’.
Even if this description held in its entirety at some point in time, the problem
with Syriza is that, once in government and even before, it gradually stopped
being all of the above. Its looseness disappeared as key issues in government
policy was limited to a core circle of cabinet ministers.
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The internally antagonistic coalitions of leftist thought and practice turned into a
distinction between the majority led by Tsipras and a minority expressed
partially by the Left Platform. Whilst Tsipras and insisted on keeping Greece
within the Eurozone the Left Platform hesitantly posed the Eurozone issue as
an open question rather than as a finalised position but nevertheless chose not
to argue in support of Grexit.
Any sort of dialectical interaction between the positions and assessments of the
various tendencies inside Syriza, even if these ceased to be institutionalised in
2013, was put on hold. All organisational and ideological processes that would
lead to further development paused along with it.
The party was no longer the main issue; running the state was. For a new party
without highly developed structures and the lack of internal cohesion
masqueraded by abolishing the system of tendencies, running the state is a
tricky business. The practice of having those working for the party not
participating in government may have worked in achieving the continuance of
Syriza on the ground but it also resulted to the ground’s detachment from the
party in public office.
Many features portrayed by Syriza since February 2015 had previously been
exhibited by AKEL, the first case of a left-wing party heading the government in
the EU and the Eurozone. In both cases, executive responsibility was
accompanied by ideological moderation, consecutive compromises and populist
rhetoric that was disproportional to the party’s traditional constituencies.
The leadership of both parties premised their potential to govern on the basis of
their more egalitarian programme based on the possibility of negotiating
effectively within the ambit of Eurozone mechanisms, institutions, political
dynamics and geopolitical surroundings. In both cases they failed.
If AKEL’s case did not affect the rest of the European radical left, the
mainstream drift of Syriza has done damage already. It hurt the European anti-
austerity movements and parties like Podemos, whose claims – that the
Eurozone’s confines are adjustable – and tactics – to remain focused on a
consensual mood and pursue institutional negotiations at the EU level – are
inspired by assumptions previously defended by Syriza.
Cyprus may be viewed as too small to matter, the crisis hadn’t arrived when
AKEL assumed power and the Cypriot communists never symbolised the
movement-like dynamism of the anti-austerity march that Syriza contributed
towards creating.
 As for Greece, the question of concern should not be if Syriza will be radically
left-wing but, rather, if it will attract individuals and collectivities that are.
Although, in theory, it is simply impossible for Syriza to truly represent at the
same time those who stand to benefit from the third memorandum and austerity
and those who stand to lose from them, Pasok was able to do so in the period
2009-2012.
Syriza’s new identity may not be at stake at this point – its Pasokification seems
inevitable – so if the party retains radical left activists, trade unionists, members
and voters within its ranks, then it is stealing away from even the softest
resistance to more austerity.
The referendum and its aftermath
The referendum was of critical significance and its impact on Greek society and
politics has not yet been exhausted. In societal terms, it awoke parts of the
movement and it has also allowed large segments of society to return to
politics, to develop positions and express them in public.
In political terms, it affected various components of the party system: change in
the leadership of New Democracy, with an opening up of the question of that
party’s orientation, the establishment of bridges between Syriza and Antarsya -
as the No campaign was largely conducted by rank and file left-wing activists
across the board and the revelation of To Potami as an ultra-neoliberal force
having to shed any remaining centrist pretenses.
Above all, it allowed for the crystallisation of the position of Eurozone exit within
the ranks of Syriza and now Popular Unity. For the first time, a significant
portion of former Syriza cadres and activists are explicitly calling for withdrawal
from the Eurozone and have formulated a political programme based on this
fundamental goal. It seems that it had previously been difficult for them to
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project this position based on speculation. Having to face the lenders’
ruthlessness proved to be detrimental for the next step in left-wing
Euroscepticism.
Indeed, since the referendum the underlying cleavage of divisions within the left
concerns above all the issue of European integration. Syriza is arguing against
the viability of a Eurozone exit and is willing to succumb to austerity at least for
the moment; the position of Popular Unity projects Eurozone exit as the only
progressive solution and, whilst willing to discuss EU membership, insists on
practices that are as consensual as possible; Antarsya is calling for a rupture
with both the Eurozone and the EU without concern for consensus and on the
basis of a radical transition towards socialism; and the KKE insists on the
immediate and complete socialisation of the means of production outside of the
EU.
Although the position of Antarsya, along with some other fringe left-wing
groups, is closer to that of the KKE rather than Popular Unity, their
expectations, discussions and aborted attempts for common action have so far
been orientated towards Popular Unity rather than KKE.
There is an ideological reason as well as a practical one for this. The ideological
reason is the Trotskyist emphasis on a ‘transitional’ programme of action
whereby advanced reformist demands are articulated by revolutionaries who
expect radicalisation as these demands cannot be accommodated in the
current conjuncture by the bourgeois state.
The practical reason concerns the historic isolationism of the KKE, a legacy of
both its Stalinist tradition and its own mode of operation, which precludes any
alliance with other political formations. These two factors have been relevant for
some time now and the stance of KKE in the referendum has strengthened
them further.
The KKE’s decision to call for a blank vote bordered on narcissistic
sectarianism, whereby the party, its structures, its ideology and its programme
are not open to any kind of questioning, amendment or postponement. The
issue was misidentified as an ideological rather than as a political one.
That is why in real political terms, the KKE failed ‘to be there’, ready and
capable of mobilising and leading the left after the capitulation of the Syriza
leadership. It was such a huge opportunity that was missed, that one cannot but
wonder if the KKE ever aimed at leading individuals and organisations that do
not yet have a fully developed class-consciousness and are hesitant as to the
potential for direct confrontation.
Both within and outside parliament, the KKE has spent enormous resources
vilifying the whole of Syriza, and more so its radical-left elements. In this light, it
is as if the Communist Party as a shared experience rests on the refutation of
any other kind of left-wing experiment, even ones that could be potentially won
over to the party’s perspective on many issues. Above all, KKE views itself
diachronically as the only truly revolutionary force. This is not based on an
empirical assessment of the other left wing forces but more importantly
constitutes a monist ontological premise that there can only be one vanguard of
the working class.
Inasmuch as electoral potential is concerned, Popular Unity is currently the
front-runner in the attempt to revive Syriza’s popular radicalism. Nevertheless,
its current appeal, weaknesses and opportunities have been delimited by
mistakes made while its leaders were still members of Syriza.
The decision to form a party may not have been an erratic one in the sense that
a maturation process preceded the establishment of Popular Unity, time-wise,
however, this maturation period was short. Many of those now leading or active
inside Popular Unity had no idea they would soon form a new party before the
referendum and had to face the confusion of a collective existential crisis.
In any case, trusting the government too much, not preparing for this option
and, in essence, for capitulation, Syriza’s left delayed significantly a left turn and
this now carries significant costs for the anti-austerity forces; it limits its
credibility, organisational cohesion and programmatic articulation.
It is a medium-term matter whether Popular Unity can operate a different and
radical signifying framework of political action. This is primarily, but not
exclusively, an issue of party organisation. As points of command are
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established within the party structure so ideological tendencies crystallise into
political trends. 
The formation process of Popular Unity is indicative of the clay feet that the
party will soon be standing on without a 25 strong parliamentary group. This is
not an entity that is actively supported by the movements of which it is a part, as
the movements themselves are still at awe, in total disarray and with the sense
of defeat.
Its economic programme, one based on the research and argumentation of a
handful of economists, is full of contradictions, simplifications and ‘constructive
ambiguities’. Clearly, there is still an amorphous space inside Popular Unity and
in electoral terms this translates into an inclination not to push public opinion too
far by suggesting two steps forward instead of one. 
This is still a project in the making. It must not therefore be viewed as a ‘final
product’ that will remain unchanged for the foreseeable future or that will not be
subject to internal dynamics and antagonisms or the developments in relation to
the other forces of the left.
This is both the end of an era and the closing of a window of opportunity for the
left. On the one hand it experientially revealed the limitations of a systemic fight,
at least in what concerns the Eurozone, and it also exposed neoliberal
fundamentalism in all its nakedness. 
In the process of doing so, the referendum has repoliticised Greek society,
opened up questions of EU membership and currency type. On the other hand,
the third memorandum signed by Tsipras signifies political surrender and. more
importantly, ideological defeat for the left.
Whether this setback proves temporary or long lasting remains, of course, an
open question that depends on a series of factors both in relation to the social
reception of the new austerity package in Greece, as well as regarding the
developments in the economies and societies of other European countries.
The social and political openings produced by the Syriza phenomenon have
been closed by Syriza itself. Yet political processes such as the rise of an anti-
austerity force from obscurity to power and political events such as the defiance
by a bankrupt state’s citizens for the Troika’s final offer, are now historical
precedents. They are present and ready to be taken on by new forces in search
of signifiers for rupture.
If you enjoyed this article then please consider liking Can Europe Make it? on
Facebook and following us on Twitter @oD_Europe
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